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GESTATICIDE: KILLING THE SUBJECT OF AN ARTIFICIAL WOMB 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The rapid development of artificial womb technologies means that we must consider if and when 
it is permissible to kill the human subject of ectogestation—recently termed a ‘gestateling’ by 
Elizabeth Chloe Romanis—prior to ‘birth’. We describe the act of deliberately killing the 
gestateling as gestaticide and argue that there are good reasons to maintain that gestaticide is 
morally equivalent to infanticide, which we consider to be morally impermissible. First, we argue 
that gestaticide is harder to justify than abortion, primarily because the gestateling is completely 
independent of its biological parents. Second, we argue that gestaticide is morally equivalent to 
infanticide. To demonstrate this, we explain that gestatelings are born in a straightforward sense, 
which entails that killing them is infanticide. However, to strengthen our overall claim, we also 
show that if gestatelings are not considered to have been born, killing them is still equivalent to 
killing neonates with congenital anomalies and disabilities, which again is infanticide. We 
conclude by considering how our discussion of gestaticide has implications for the permissibility 
of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from gestatelings. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Development of artificial womb technology (AWT) and related technologies are rapidly 
progressing, generating new ethical challenges.[1,2] The term gestateling has been coined by 
Elizabeth Chloe Romanis to describe the human subject of a period of ex utero artificial 
gestation—or ectogestation—thus distinguishing it from a fetus or preterm neonate.[3] One 
pertinent question is whether it is permissible to end the life of a gestateling.1 Here, we refer to the 
act of deliberately killing the gestateling as gestaticide. Gestaticide seems related to abortion and 
infanticide: each involves killing a human being during its early developmental stages. But, prima 
facie, gestaticide does not fit into either category. Here, we examine the comparative morality of 
induced abortion, infanticide, and gestaticide. We defend two claims: first, that morally speaking, 
gestaticide is harder to justify than abortion. Second, that morally speaking, gestaticide is as hard 
to justify as infanticide.2 We show that if infanticide—particularly when carried out against 
developmentally immature neonates—is immoral, then gestaticide is immoral in the same way. If 
one wishes to defend the permissibility of gestaticide, therefore, one must accept the permissibility 
of infanticide in many cases. We end by considering implications for the (im)permissibility of 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from gestatelings. 
 
Ectogestation will require a surgical procedure to transfer the fetus from the pregnant woman to 
an artificial womb. It seems likely there will be instances of ectogestation where, at some point, 
the gestateling will no longer be wanted. The reasons women give for procuring abortions are 
multiple and diverse, and it is likely that similar reasons will be nominated for gestaticide. These 
might include financial stress, a change in relationship with a partner, illness, gestateling ill-health 
or disability, or another change in circumstances that means the gestateling is no longer desired.3 
However, in such cases, gestaticide is not the only option available—the parents could choose to 
offer it up for adoption. For gestaticide to be considered, therefore, it must be that its parents do 
not wish for the gestateling to exist at all.4 When is it permissible to act on this wish? By comparing 
gestaticide to abortion and infanticide, we provide an answer. 
 
1 Recently, Victoria Adkins raised—but did not answer—the question of how current legislation ‘could be applied to 
a request to terminate an ectogenic fetus,’ while suggesting that ‘reform or new legislation’ is needed to handle those 
requests.[33] We focus on the morality of killing gestatelings, rather than the legality, but the issues are often 
connected. 
2 If infanticide is harder to justify than abortion, then the second claim entails the first. We split the two claims to 
emphasise that even if we fail to defend the second, the first may remain intact. 
3 People may also seek the death of the gestateling for the antinatalist reason suggested by Räsänen—that it will be 
better off not existing, as it will avoid the inevitable suffering that comes with life.[34] Or, like Räsänen argues 
elsewhere, some may claim that one’s right to “not be a parent” gives one the right to practice gestaticide.[5] The 
argument presented below challenges this latter claim, however, in that one’s right to not be a parent cannot justify 
gestaticide any more than it can justify infanticide. 
4 The death of gestatelings may be sought for other reasons. For example, Savulescu, Tooley, and Stirton all suggest 
we use AWT to grow human organisms for the purpose of harvesting their organs and tissues for therapeutic 
purposes.[35-38]  
  
GESTATICIDE IS HARDER TO JUSTIFY THAN ABORTION 
 
There are significant moral differences between abortion and gestaticide. Suppose that fetuses and 
gestatelings of the same gestational ages have equivalent moral statuses, whether equivalent to the 
moral status of newborns or not. 
 
First, arguments for abortion predicated on bodily autonomy or self-defence fail to justify 
gestaticide. The subject of abortion is a fetus, which is developing within a pregnant woman, while 
the subject of gestaticide is a gestateling, which resides within an artificial womb (AW) and is 
completely independent from its biological parents. A pregnant woman gestating a fetus makes 
significant sacrifices with regard to bodily autonomy—the parents of a gestateling do not. Judith 
Jarvis Thomson argues that in many cases, the sacrifices of pregnancy entail there is no moral 
obligation for a woman to offer her body as a life support system for the fetus, and this implies 
abortion is permissible, even if the fetus is granted the moral status of a person.[4] A gestateling’s 
life support, however, is provided by the AW it is contained within, not its parent’s body. So, even 
if Thomson’s argument provides some justification for abortion, it cannot justify gestaticide in the 
same way. 
 
Second, AWT allows for an option other than death. Currently, abortions do not—the fetus 
invariably dies, even if the goal is to end pregnancy rather than kill the fetus. Supposing a 
gestateling has a moral status equivalent to that of an adult, it cannot be permissible to end its 
life—its right to life prohibits this. If we only grant the gestateling some moral status, it is less 
clear whether the gestateling’s life can be ended. Joona Räsänen, for example, argues that there is 
a right to the death of the gestateling once it is extracted from its parent.[5] Räsänen predicates 
this on three other rights: the right not to be a genetic parent, the right to genetic privacy, and 
property rights. Numerous philosophers have argued that Räsänen is unsuccessful in establishing 
a right to the death of the fetus whether AWT is viable or not.[6-9] Importantly, Thomson herself 
argues that there is no right to the death of the fetus. Mary Anne Warren makes a similar point: if 
a pregnancy could be ended without killing the fetus then there is no right to the fetus’ death.5[10]  
 
Because the parent’s bodily autonomy is not a consideration and there is no clear right to the death 
of the gestateling, therefore, it is considerably more difficult to justify gestaticide than it is to 
justify abortion. Justifications for abortion are either not relevant or lack the cogency and scope to 
also justify gestaticide. 
 
 
GESTATICIDE AND INFANTICIDE 
 
The arguments we developed above also imply that infanticide is harder to justify than abortion: a 
widely—but not universally—shared moral intuition. This does not automatically mean that 
gestaticide and infanticide are morally on a par, however. To compare them, we must examine two 
possibilities: first, that gestaticide is a form of infanticide, and second, that gestaticide is not 
infanticide, but something different. 
 
 
GESTATICIDE IS INFANTICIDE 
 
Nicholas Colgrove defends the view that gestaticide is a form of infanticide.[11,12] Assuming 
current international standards of ‘live birth’ in legal and medical communities are correct, subjects 
of ectogestation—those that have been extracted from their mothers’ bodies and placed in an 
AW—have literally been born.6[11,13-17] If so, then to kill a gestateling is to kill a neonate. 
Hence, gestaticide is a form of infanticide.  
 
 
5 If that is correct, then questions arise concerning whether such transfers should be mandatory, how they would harm 
women, etc.[39] If fetuses are persons, parents may be required to make relevant sacrifices to ensure the fetus’s 
survival.[40] If fetuses have only partial moral status, the issue is less clear. Whether mandatory extraction is morally 
sound is tangential to our project, however, so we will set it aside. 
6 This leaves out subjects of complete ectogestation—those that are conceived via IVF and immediately placed in an 
AW. For simplicity, we focus on subjects of partial ectogestation throughout this project (unless otherwise noted). 
Even if gestaticide is a form of infanticide, however, that does not entail that it is as wrong—or as 
difficult to justify—as infanticide. Perhaps gestaticide is a morally ‘less bad’ species of infanticide 
because gestatelings are different from other neonates in morally relevant ways.7 
 
Romanis, and Kingma and Finn, for example, argue that gestatelings and neonates in the NICU 
are relevantly different because they function differently.[18,19] According to Kingma and Finn, 
gestatelings exist ex utero, but function like fetuses, whereas neonates in the NICU exist ex utero 
and function like neonates. For Kingma and Finn, ‘fetuses and neonates do not just have different 
physiological but different physical characteristics.’[19] Physically, fetuses have extra organs and 
structures that neonates do not—a placenta, umbilical cord, etc. Physiologically, fetuses and 
neonates differ in that ‘fetuses do not breathe but oxygenate their blood via the placenta,’ each 
possesses ‘a completely different cardiovascular set-up: the fetal heart functions as a single (rather 
than, in neonates, a double) pump; ... and so on.’[19] Let ‘fetal-function’ refer to relevant physical 
and physiological characteristics typical of fetuses, while ‘neonatal-function’ refers to relevant 
characteristics typical of neonates.8 
 
Gestatelings have not transitioned from fetal-function to neonatal-function. Is this difference 
enough to show that gestaticide is easier to justify than infanticide? No. After all, Kingma and Finn 
recognise that there are currently neonates in the NICU that have failed to transition from fetal-
function to neonatal-function.[19] In such cases, the ‘baby cannot, or struggles to, perform certain 
physiological requirements of babies that weren’t required for fetal physiology.’[19] To insist that 
the transition from fetal-function to neonatal-function is so morally relevant as to justify gestaticide 
but not infanticide, one would have to accept that killing these neonates is easier to justify in the 
same way.9 
 
By Kingma and Finn’s account, neonates that have failed to make the relevant transition include 
many with ‘lung-problems, cardiac defects, etc.’[19] This suggests that neonates who struggle to 
 
7 ‘Other’ neonates because we are supposing (for now) that gestatelings have been born. 
8 For a detailed explanation of the transition from fetal-function to neonatal-function, see Morton and Brodsky.[41] 
9 Kingma and Finn need not argue that the difference in function grounds a moral difference between gestaticide and 
infanticide. But, as we explain below, on Kingma's preferred metaphysics, it seems hard to resist the claim that the 
difference in function has moral import. Also, if the difference in function makes no moral difference, then those who 
think gestaticide is easier to justify than (standard cases of) infanticide still owe us an explanation as to why. 
function as neonates—including many with congenital defects—are judged to be more justifiably 
killed than their healthy, term counterparts. This point becomes more apparent when considering 
the metaphysics in Kingma’s proposal more broadly. For her, fetuses are part of their mothers’ 
bodies.[20] Hence, individuals that have failed to transition from fetus-function to neonatal-
function are comparable to ‘detached body part[s].’[19,20] Thus, whether it is justifiable to 
‘dispose’ of gestatelings and affected neonates raises similar questions to whether it is justifiable 
to dispose of one’s detached body parts (e.g., gametes, blood, etc.).10[19] 
 
So, if gestaticide is infanticide, we are faced with two options. First: accept that gestaticide is as 
hard to justify as (standard cases of) infanticide. Alternatively, distinguish between gestatelings 
and (other) neonates in a way that explains why killing the former is easier to justify than the latter. 
A plausible way of doing so—as offered by Romanis and Kingma and Finn—is to focus on the 
distinction between fetal-function and neonatal-function.11 On that view, however, one must 
accept that killing many neonates with congenital anomalies and disabilities is more justifiable 
than killing ‘normally-functioning’ neonates. This view is morally dubious.12 Reasons to reject 
those claims, therefore, are reasons to reject the claim that gestaticide is a ‘less bad’ species of 
infanticide. Romanis and Kingma and Finn may object: gestaticide cannot be thought of as 
infanticide at all because gestatelings have not been born.[18,19] This raises the second possibility, 
that gestaticide is not infanticide.  
 
 
GESTATICIDE IS NOT INFANTICIDE 
 
If gestaticide is not infanticide, then gestatelings have not been born. We begin by arguing that the 
reasons for thinking gestatelings have not been born are unpersuasive. Hence, gestaticide is 
 
10 There may be ableist overtones here, since a lesser moral status is assigned to neonates with various anomalies, 
‘defects,’ and disabilities. A full treatment of this issue goes beyond the scope of our essay, however. 
11 Kingma and Finn reject various other ways of drawing the distinction (which were proposed by Romanis).[3,19] 
Assuming they are right, this makes the fetal-function/neonatal-function distinction the only real candidate for 
distinguishing gestatelings from (other) neonates. 
12 The view that termination of ‘defective’ neonates—e.g., those with  ‘lung-problems, heart defects, etc.’[19]—is 
‘easier’ to justify than termination of ‘normally-functioning’ neonates is vehemently rejected by many.[42-45] 
Binding and Hoche defended such a view at length; work that supposedly served as a basis for ‘Nazi genetic 
philosophy.’[46,47] 
infanticide. But suppose we are wrong and gestatelings really have not been born. If so, one must 
either accept that gestaticide is as hard to justify as infanticide or accept the morally dubious claim 
that it is more justifiable, morally speaking, to kill neonates with congenital anomalies than their 
‘normally-functioning’ counterparts. Whether gestatelings have been born or not, therefore, there 
are good reasons to conclude that gestaticide is as hard to justify as infanticide. 
 
 
GESTATELINGS, ‘BIRTH’ AND METAMORPHOSIS 
 
Why think that gestatelings have not been born? Romanis claims gestatelings are ‘born only in a 
geographical sense’ and so, have ‘not completed all of birth.’[18] Kingma and Finn unpack 
Romanis’s claim, distinguishing between two events: the ‘born-by-location-change’ and the ‘born-
by-physiology-change.’[19]  
 
Birth ‘by-location’ occurs when fetuses are extracted from the bodies of their mothers and remain 
alive. This is no different than current international (medical and legal) definitions of ‘birth.’[13-
17] Subjects of partial ectogestation, therefore, have undergone the ‘born-by-location-
change.’[12,18,19] The ‘born-by-physiology-change’ is more complicated. To complete this 
change, developing humans must fully transition from fetal-function to neonatal-function. 
Gestatelings have not completed this transition. Hence, they are not yet born. 
 
Why think that transitioning from fetal-function to neonatal-function is a necessary part of birth? 
Kingma and Finn note that typically (and historically) the two transitions have tended to occur at 
roughly the same time.[19] But this does not imply the transitions occur together out of necessity. 
In fact, what ectogestation shows is that the two transitions coincide accidentally, since AWT 
would allow the location-change to occur while substantially delaying changes in gestatelings’ 
physical and physiological features. Furthermore, the transition from fetal-function to neonatal-
function more closely resembles another kind of naturally occurring phenomenon: metamorphosis. 
 
As Ronca et al. put it, ‘The metamorphosis from fetus to newborn constitutes the most profound 
developmental transformation in a mammal’s life...To ensure its survival at birth, the newborn 
mammal must swiftly recruit a veritable constellation of novel physiological and behavioral 
responses.’13[21] Moreover, there are striking similarities between metamorphosis and 
mammalian birth; Daniel Buchholz describes how a frog metamorphosis model can help 
understand human perinatal development.[22] Since ‘metamorphosis’ is a precise biological term, 
we will describe the relevant transition as ‘Homometamorphosis’ or ‘H-metamorphosis’ to 
indicate that it applies specifically to humans undergoing the transition from fetal-function to 
neonatal-function.14 
 
For Kingma and Finn, birth ‘marks the transition from being part of another organism, to no longer 
being such a part.’15[19] H-metamorphosis is not required for this transition. Recall the neonates 
who complete birth ‘by-location’ but not H-metamorphosis.[19] If completing H-metamorphosis 
is required for birth, then gestatelings have not been born, but neither have many neonates with 
serious congenital anomalies. On Kingma’s account of pregnancy, gestatelings and many neonates 
with serious congenital anomalies would still be parts of their mothers’ bodies.[19,20] Claims that 
neonates with serious congenital anomalies are ‘detached body parts’ or ‘have not been born’ will 
seem highly implausible to many people. 
 
Kingma and Finn will likely accuse us of begging the question here: the main reason many people 
think these ‘babies’ have been born is due to the historical and cultural dominance of the ‘fetal 
container model’ of pregnancy.[19] Maybe so. But just because a belief arises from culturally 
dominant presuppositions does not render that belief false. Kingma and Finn may explain the 
genealogy of the relevant belief, but have not undermined its validity. 
 
Critically, we need a reason to believe that H-metamorphosis is required for birth. The following 
observations are insufficient: (a) fetus-function differs from neonatal-function, (b) gestatelings 
function in the former way whereas (most) neonates function in the latter way, and (c) H-
metamorphosis and birth-by-location often occur in close succession. We can accept (a)-(c) while 
 
13 They also list the same kinds of changes Kingma and Finn list as essential to the ‘born-by-physiology-change,’ so 
it is clear the authors are speaking about the same transition.[19,21] 
14 Describing the transition from fetal-function to neonatal-function as metamorphosis fits with some of Kingma and 
Finn’s own illustrations. When describing the ‘born-by-physiology-change,’ for example, they compare it to ‘tadpoles 
los[ing] their tail as they become frogs’ and caterpillars becoming butterflies.[19]  
15 At least if we accept Kingma’s preferred account of the metaphysics of ‘birth.’[20] 
still denying Kingma and Finn’s claim that ‘birth is not just a change of location.’[19] That is, 
none of these observations establish a necessary connection between birth and H-metamorphosis.16 
 
Finally, given the stakes, we need a very compelling argument for why H-metamorphosis is 
essential to birth. Such a claim runs contrary to widely accepted, international—legal and 
medical—standards of ‘birth’ and would have serious practical implications if true. Legally, birth 
is deeply intertwined with personhood (i.e., having rights). If completing H-metamorphosis is 
essential to birth, therefore, then the completion of H-metamorphosis becomes the new standard 
for legal personhood (rather than birth-by-location). This makes the standard for legal personhood 
far more subjective and less useful as a legal instrument. It is relatively easy to assess when a 
human being has been extracted and is alive compared to assessing whether or not it has completed 
the transition from fetal-function to neonatal-function. When this transition takes days—which 
Kingma and Finn suggest is fairly common[19]—relevant human subjects would seemingly have 
their legal personhood (including rights and citizenship) held in limbo.17 
 
Further, making H-metamorphosis the standard for moral personhood would seemingly allow the 
possibility that killing neonates with serious congenital anomolies would be, in Kingma and Finn’s 
words, morally akin to destroying a ‘detached’ body part.[19] Killing such neonates would literally 
be a kind of ‘after-birth abortion.’18[23,24] The concept of ‘after-birth abortion’ has been widely 
criticised as nothing other than infanticide,[25-29] though some authors have continued to defend 
it.19[30] Claiming that many neonates with congenital anomalies are merely ‘detached body parts’ 
would likely be met with the same charge and rejection. Widespread rejection does not make the 
view false, of course. But since the view is at odds with foundational (and international) legal 
standards and at odds with widely held moral beliefs and intuitions, it carries a very high cost. 
 
16 Consider, for example, Hume’s observation that constant conjunction of two events is insufficient reason to infer 
that a necessary connection holds between them.[48] This point is especially relevant to (c). 
17 Romanis considers inventing a ‘third [legal] status’ for ‘partially born’ humans, including gestatelings.[49] This is 
sensible only if gestatelings have not been legally born in a ‘complete’ sense, however. But gestatelings unequivocally 
satisfy the current legal standards for ‘birth.’.[13-17] So, invention of a third legal status does not seem warranted. 
18 Where ‘birth’ in ‘after-birth abortion’ is understood as ‘birth-by-location’ only. 
19 One reviewer presses this point, noting that other authors have defended the permissibility of infanticide to some 
degree or another.[30,50,51] Assessing the permissibility of infanticide in detail goes beyond the scope of our essay. 
For the time being, our argument rests on the claim that infanticide is widely rejected (which is compatible with it 
being defended by a fairly small group of academics). 
Convincing an audience to accept these costs will require an exceptionally strong argument. 
Appeals to observations (a)-(c) fall far below that standard. 
 
 
SUPPOSE THAT GESTATICIDE IS NOT INFANTICIDE 
 
If gestaticide is not infanticide it must be that gestatelings have not been born. Kingma and Finn 
explain that gestatelings have not completed (what we term) ‘H-metamorphosis,’ but fail to explain 
why completing it is essential to birth.[19] Imagine, however, that we discover a sound argument 
for the claim that gestatelings have not been born. Is killing gestatelings thereby easier to justify 
than killing otherwise comparable neonates? Why think that? There seem to be two options: 
gestaticide is easier to justify (i) because gestatelings have not completed ‘birth,’ while neonates 
have, or, (ii) because gestatelings have not completed H-metamorphosis, while neonates have. 
Both options fail. 
 
Regarding the first option, according to Kingma and Finn, birth is ‘morally relevant’ precisely 
because subjects that are born ‘can now be accessed, interacted with, treated and kept alive without 
having to consider the mother’s rights to bodily integrity/physical autonomy.’[19] Gestatelings 
embody all of these features: they exist and can be kept alive independently of their mothers’ 
bodies, etc. Even if gestatelings have not been born, therefore, they possess the exact same features 
that make birth morally relevant in the first place. So appeals to birth as making a relevant moral 
difference between gestatelings and neonates does not work. 
 
The second option—the claim that completion of H-metamorphosis is what makes the moral 
difference—also fails. Gestatelings have not completed H-metamorphosis, but the same goes for 
many neonates with congenital anomalies and disabilities. Suppose completion of H-
metamorphosis is what makes the moral difference between gestaticide and infanticide. Assuming 
that gestaticide is easier to justify than infanticide, it follows that killing neonates with congenital 
anomolies or disibilities is easier to justify as well (since many of them have not completed H-
metamorphosis either). If completion of H-metamorphosis is what makes the moral difference, 
therefore, one must accept highly dubious moral claims about the relative permissibility of killing 
neonates with congenital anomalies. Since there are good reasons to reject those claims, there are 
good reasons to maintain that gestaticide is as hard to justify as infanticide. 
 
 
BEYOND KILLING: IMPLICATIONS FOR WITHDRAWING LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT 
 
We have argued that gestaticide is harder to justify than abortion and that there are good reasons 
to think that gestaticide is as hard to justify as infanticide (whether gestatelings have been born or 
not). What about cases in which life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn and this results in death? 
Not every such case will count as gestaticide, nor will every such case be impermissible. This 
matters because cases of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment like this are not uncommon in 
neonatal care;[31]  doing so is commonly thought to be justified when the neonate’s death is 
imminent and continued treatment is judged to be futile (or excessively burdensome).[32]  
 
For example,20 suppose a premature neonate is being kept alive by life-sustaining treatment (e.g. 
intubation and mechanical ventilation), despite having suffered from an extensive and catastrophic 
brain-injury. The medical team concludes that this neonate’s death is imminent and inevitable. It 
may, in this case, be permissible to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from the neonate even 
though doing so will hasten death. Death, in this case, is not intended and withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment is not rightly thought of as an act of killing.21[32] 
 
In other words, ‘infanticide’ as we understand it, does not obviously refer to acts of withdrawing 
life-sustaning treatment where death is not intended (even though withdrawing care might result 
in or hasten death).[32] Likewise, ‘gestaticide’ does not refer to every case in which a gestateling 
dies after life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn. Withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from a 
gestateling with the intention that it dies may count as gestaticide. Withdrawing life-sustaining 
 
20 Much of our argument here relies on inferences and arguments quite common within discussions of intention and 
the Doctrine of Double-Effect.[32,52]  
21 Alternatively, if life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn with the intent that the patient dies, that does seem to 
constitute an act of killing. These claims are not novel; for the same kinds of arguments and distinctions, see Kaczor’s 
discussion of ‘double-effect reasoning.’[53] 
treatment in cases where the gestateling is having some serious health problem(s)—specifically, 
where continued treatment is futile, death is imminent, and the death of the gestateling is not 
intended—would not count as gestaticide. These suggestions render two hypotheses plausible. We 
will discuss each, but cannot defend them at length here.  
 
First, when it is permissible to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from neonates in the NICU, it 
will be permissible to withdraw it from comparable gestatelings (where all else is equal insofar as 
is possible). Suppose, for example, that it is permissible to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from 
neonates when doing so is futile. We may infer that when continued treatment of gestatelings is 
futile in the same way, withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is permissible in those cases as well.  
 
Second, when it is impermissible to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from neonates, it will be 
impermissible to do so from comparable gestatelings (all else being equal insofar as is possible). 
For example, it is morally impermissible to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a neonate 
simply because that neonate has congenital anomalies. We may infer that withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment from gestatelings simply because they have congenital anomalies is morally 
impermissible for the same reasons. 
 
To block these hypotheses, one must show that gestatelings and comparable neonates are different 
in some morally relevant way. Birth ‘by-location’ is clearly of no use here, since gestatelings and 
neonates have both completed that transition. Appeals to the completion of H-metamorphosis fail 
as well, because a human subject’s failure to complete H-metamorphosis by itself is insufficient 
justification for withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from them. Recall that many neonates today 
have not completed H-metamorphosis; for Kingma and Finn, these include many neonates with 
certain ‘lung-problems, heart defects, etc.’[19] Having these kinds of issues is not by itself reason 
to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. Doing so, in many cases, is rightly regarded as immoral.22 
In fact, whether or not a subject has completed H-metamorphosis has no real bearing on whether 
or not it would be permissible to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from that subject. We do not 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from neonates in cases where they simply have failed to 
complete what we have termed H-metamorphosis. Rather, treatment can only be justifiably 
 
22 In fact, such acts would typically be illegal in the US, constituting clear cases of ‘medical neglect.’[54] 
withdrawn when its continuation is futile, and death is imminent, etc. Whether H-metamorphosis 
has been completed or not is irrelevant, therefore. What matters is whether treatment is futile or 
whether death is imminent. But if completion of H-metamorphosis is irrelevant in the case of 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from neonates, it should be irrelevant in the case of 
withdrawing life support from gestatelings.  
 
Put differently, if we accept that failure to complete H-metamorphosis is sufficient reason to 
withdraw life support from gestatelings, then we are justified all the same when withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment from neonates who have not yet completed H-metamorphosis. This holds 
even in cases where these neonates will complete the relevant processes soon. But we do not allow 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from neonates under these circumstances. So, we should 
not allow withdrawal of life support from gestatelings in the same condition. Hence, failure to 
complete H-metamorphosis cannot be sufficient justification for gestaticide but not infanticide. If 
we allow gestaticide on this basis, we must also allow infanticide. Whatever reasons we have for 
rejecting infanticide in these cases, therefore, serve as reasons for rejecting  gestaticide as well. 
 
Finally, if failure to complete H-metamorphosis is—by itself—sufficient justification for the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, then one must accept that withdrawing support from any 
neonate that has not completed H-metamorphosis is permissible. Yet again, this means embracing 
morally dubious claims regarding the permissibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from 
neonates simply because they are affected by congenital anomalies. To resist those claims—which 
we have good reason to do—one must accept that it is just as hard to justify withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment from gestatelings as it is to justify withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from 
neonates. Hence, we have good reasons to think that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from 
gestatelings is as hard to justify as withdrawing it from neonates without appropriate medical 
indication to do so. 
 
What about extremely young gestatelings? If it is permissible to withdraw life-sustaining treatment 
from anencephalic neonates, for example, maybe it is permissible to do so from gestatelings whose 
brains have not yet developed. After all, anencephalic neonates are comparable to extremely young 
gestatelings in that neither have developed brains. This would seemingly justify withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment from any gestateling up until a particular point in development. However, 
young gestatelings will develop brains in typical cases whereas anencephalic neonates will not. 
Young gestatelings are, therefore, more comparable to neonates in the NICU that have 
neurological conditions which we fully expect will resolve in the near future. If it is impermissible 
to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from those neonates, therefore, it seems impermissible to 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from very young gestatelings.23  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Gestaticide is the deliberate killing of gestatelings, which, we have argued, should be considered 
as morally serious as infanticide. This holds whether gestatelings have been born or not (i.e., 
whether gestaticide is a literal form of infanticide or not). So, while we have argued that claims 
that gestatelings have not been born are largely unpersuasive, our conclusion does not require a 
commitment to the claim that gestatelings have been born. We ended by arguing that withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment from gestatelings seems to be as difficult to justify as withdrawing it from 
neonates as well. As AWT becomes available, we must therefore prohibit the deliberate killing of 
gestatelings—in the same way we prohibit infanticide. We must also ensure that withdrawal of life 
support from gestatelings occurs in only the most serious of circumstances (where treatment is 
futile and death is imminent), in the same way that we permit withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment from neonates in only extreme circumstances as well. 
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